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STEPHEN COLBERT IS RIGHT TO LAMPOON
OUR CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM
(AND So CAN YOU!)
ILYA SHAPIRO*
Thank you very much for having me. I'm probably more excited than
you are to hear what I have to say because I'm not exactly sure what it'll be.
I've been on Obamacare duty 24/7 for I don't know how long and it's hard
to switch gears. This is my second time in your fair state. The last time was
in 2001 when I was a summer associate at Dorsey & Whitney's New York
office, and they brought us here for a long weekend. I got to miieet Walter
Mondale, who is still a senior counsel. I asked him what he thought of the
Bush tax-cut plan-people were kicking me under the table-and, for the
record, he was against it.
I don't know how many of you are fans of Stephen Colbert or Jon
Stewart. I like the former, not the latter, because Stewart is all about his
political agenda, while Colbert, though similar in his political views, is
more of a showman. But I'm probably biased because Colbert had me on
his show and Stewart hasn't.' In any case, this dynamic duo, more than any
media pundits-real or fake-has in the last few months effectively shown
the unworkability, the instability, and the farcical nature of our campaign
finance regulations. They don't cover the background legal analysis and
they imply that Citizens United caused the current mess, but as entertainers
rather than legal scholars, they correctly showcase the system's absurdities.
While my diagnosis of the underlying problems-and thus my
prescription for future reform-differs from Stephen Colbert, I agree that
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our campaign finance regime leads to perverse and often comical results.
That is, I think that Citizens United was correctly decided because political
speech should be free regardless of the nature of the speaker: people don't
lose their rights when they get together and associate, whether it be in
unions, non-profit advocacy groups, private clubs, for-profit corporations,
or any other form.2 But I also think the ruling does create the odd situation
whereby independent political speech is unbridled and unrestricted for the
most part while candidates and parties are heavily restricted and heavily
regulated. If you look at who really gained for practical purposes from
Citizens United, it's non-profits, advocacy groups, and independent
speakers of various kinds, be it the Cato Institute, the Sierra Club, the
ACLU, the NRA, small business associations, or trade groups. The losers,
meanwhile, are political parties and candidates because they, in relative
terms, now have less money and less control over their message. That's not
necessarily a bad thing-parties aren't privileged under the Constitution-
but it does create a weird dynamic.
There was a satirical piece in The Atlantic by one of Obama's former
speechwriters, John Lovett-not to be confused with Jon Lovitz; that would
have been a completely different article-that presents a dystopian future
where Super PACs are all-powerful, and parties exist merely to collect
signatures and get candidates (themselves pawns) on the ballot.' No money
is going to candidates because it's all just two national Super PACs running
everything: Karl Rove's TruePAC against George Soros's (or whoever's)
GoodPAC. Every once in a while, as in 1984, they swap positions
completely-"TruePAC has always been at war with outsourcing"-the
way that the real parties have switched on various issues historically. There
are no real political campaigns any more, just constant demonizing of the
other for no reason anyone recollects. This scenario takes the current
circumstances to the extreme: we have these big groups-largely
unregulated because political speech should be unregulated-that act as
"independent" proxies for the candidates and parties, often doing the dirtiest
attack ads.
It creates a weird system; what we have now with strict limits on
contributions to candidates but not on their expenditures-or on
independent groups' contributions and expenditures-isn't stable. There's
all this money being spent on enforcement but we can't really enforce the
laws because the FEC splits 3-3 even when it manages to have a quorum.
You couldn't design a more dysfunctional system.
2. Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy, So What If Corporations Aren't People?, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 701, 707-08 (2011).
3. Jon Lovett, PACs Americana, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2012/02/pacs-americana/252379/.
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At a certain point, there are going to be enough Democratic incumbents
who say, "You know, I really want to control my message better" or "My
money is going to these groups with whom I can't coordinate." These
politicians-not the ultra-hardcore "campaign finance is my primary issue"
sort of people (who only exist within the Beltway; the rest of America cares
about real issues, be they economic, social, or foreign policy)-are going to
say "enough is enough." We have to liberalize the campaign finance
regime and get rid of limits on, or have very high caps for, contributions to
candidates-individual contributions, not corporate-and then maybe have
disclosures for those who donate more than fifty thousand, a hundred
thousand, or a million dollars, whatever the political compromise is. So
then the big boys who want to be real players in the political market will
have to put their reputations on the line, but not the average person donating
a few hundred bucks and being exposed to boycotts and vigilantes.' That
might be a political compromise that survives constitutional scrutiny and
for which there might be broad support; everyone but the most extreme
goo-goos- -the "good government" zealots-would back it.
But let me step back. Citizens United is both more and less important
than you think to this whole analysis. It's more important because, quite
beyond whatever effect it has on the amount of business or union money in
politics, it has revealed the instability and unworkability of the system as I
have described it. It's less important because it doesn't stand for half of
what many people think it does. Take, for example, President Obama's
famous statement at the State of the Union, that the case "reversed a century
of law that I believe will open the floodgates of special interests-including
foreign corporations-to spend without limit in our elections."' In that
sentence, this former constitutional law professor stated four errors of
constitutional law.
First, Citizens United didn't overturn a century of law; it overturned
twenty years at most. Obama was referring to the Tillman Act of 1907,
which prohibited direct corporate donations to candidates and parties.
Citizens United didn't touch that issue. Instead, the overturned precedent
was Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a 1990 decision that, for
the first time ever or since, sanctioned a regulation of political speech based
on something other than corruption or the appearance thereof.6
4. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010) (Disclosure "effectively become[s] a blueprint
for harassment and intimidation.").
5. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-state-union-address.
6. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990). See also llya Shapiro
& Nicholas Mosvick, Stare Decisis After Citizens United: When Can Courts Overturn Precedent,
16 NEXUS: CHAPMAN'S JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 121, 125-26 (2011) (critiquing the
president's factual assertion).
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Second, as far as opening the floodgates to special interests goes, it
depends on how you define those terms. There isn't much indication so far
in this election cycle that there's a change in kind, a geometric increase in
spending by corporations or even independent advocacy groups (though
there may be by unions). There might be an increase but it doesn't seem to
be a revolutionary change in how politics is practiced. There are certainly
now people running Super PACs who would otherwise be supporting
candidates in other ways-as bundlers or directors of regular PACs-but
Super PACs aren't a function of Citizens United (as I'll get to shortly). It's
just unclear that any "floodgates" have been opened or what these special
interests are that didn't exist before.
Third, the rights of foreigners-corporate or natural persons-is
another issue about which Citizens United said nothing. Indeed, just this
year, the Supreme Court summarily upheld the restrictions on spending by
foreign citizens in U.S. political campaigns.'
Fourth and finally, there's the charge that spending on elections now
has no limits. While that might be true in the context of independent
political speech, it's certainly not for candidates and parties-whose
spending was not at issue in Citizens United-nor for donors to candidates
and parties. Citizens United did not rule on either individual or corporate
contributions to candidates. What Citizens United did is to remove the
limits on independent associative expenditures.
These are some very basic points that even people who agree with
Citizens United often misperceive, not to mention political beat reporters
writing about this stuff.
Indeed, what was probably more important than Citizens United was
SpeechNow.org, decided two months later in the D.C. Circuit.' That
decision removed the limits on individual donations to independent
expenditure groups, which led to the creation of the so-called Super PACs.
Previously, we had plain-old PACs-political action committees-defined
as any group receiving or spending $1,000 or more for influencing
elections, to which individuals could only donate $5,000 per year. Now all
of a sudden you still have to register these groups but there are no limits on
how much people can donate to them. So SpeechNow.org is a kind of
corollary to Citizens United. Citizens United concerned the use of corporate
and union and other associative general treasury funds for political speech,
while SpeechNow.org concerned the ability of people to get together and
pool their money to speak in the same way that one very rich person could
already do.
7. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282-283 (D. D.C. 2011) aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1087
(2012).
8. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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The most important thing about Citizens United was the Supreme
Court's definitive reiteration that the only acceptable rationale for limiting
speech and enacting various other campaign finance regulations was
corruption and the appearance of corruption.' By overruling Austin, Citizens
United made it clear that equalizing voices is not a constitutionally adequate
justification for limiting independent spending.o And that means that courts
will eventually be taking closer looks at restrictions on individual donations
that are made out in the open and in the context of many other donations-
such that there can't really be an appearance of corruption.
Now, curiously, we have been hearing a lot about these Super PACs,
which are the political-speech vehicles that generated the Comedy Central
satire. Because Super PACs are supposedly so big and awful, Stephen
Colbert created the Colbert Super PAC, alternatively known as "Americans
for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow."" Then, when he decided to explore a
run for "President of the United States of South Carolina," Colbert could no
longer run the Super PAC because otherwise he would be illegally
coordinating with himself. 2 Super PACs can speak independently but they
can't "coordinate" with any campaign, so candidate Colbert had to transfer
control of Colbert Super PAC to someone else. That someone else turned
out to be Jon Stewart. There was thus this hilarious skit where Colbert
brought out Trevor Potter-one of the top election lawyers in the country
and John McCain's counsel in 2008-to explain the different rules and
preside over the transfer." The transfer document was this little one-page
thing. Colbert and Stewart both signed it and then they held hands as some
special effects came on with a green stream of dollar signs flowing from
Colbert to Stewart. Stewart then yells something like, "I have the power!" 4
Very dramatic.
9. Cf Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)).
10. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 909, 913 (2010).
11. The Colbert Report: Corp Constituency, Comedy Central (May 11, 2011), available at
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/386085/may- 11-2011 /corp-
constituency?xrs=sharecopy (Colbert establishes a Super PAC to exploit a legal loophole that
lets him talk about his campaign during his show.). See also www.cobertsuperpac.com.
12. The Colbert Report: Colbert Super PAC - Coordination Problem, Comedy Central (Jan.
12, 2012), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/405888/january-
12-2012/indecision-2012-colbert-super-pac-coordination-problem (Colbert realizes that
candidates can't coordinate with Super PACs, so he can't legally remain active in his Super
PAC's management.).
13. The Colbert Report: Colbert Super PAC - Coordination Resolution with Jon Stewart,
Comedy Central (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-
videos/405889/january- 12-2012/indecision-2012-colbert-super-pac--coordination-resolution-
with-jon-stewart (Trevor Potter explains that the law permits Jon Stewart to oversee the Super
PAC notwithstanding his business relationship with Colbert. Potter presides over the transfer of
control, which consists of both comedians signing a single-page double-spaced form.).
14. Id.
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But also very funny, because obviously the only thing that has changed
is that instead of Colbert being the figurehead for a Super PAC and its
funders, Stewart is the figurehead-and Stewart can keep on as employees
the very same people who had been working for Colbert. Even though
Colbert and Stewart are close friends and colleagues, regularly discuss their
mutual business and entertainment interests, and employ the same people,
they're not coordinating for purposes of campaign finance law-as long as
they don't discuss Stephen's campaign. (For this satire, they even invented
a farcical business called "From Schmear to Eternity," a combination bagel
shop and travel agency which takes you to places that don't have bagels but
give you a bag of bagels as you board the plane.)" Moreover, Colbert
wasn't allowed to discuss his political plans with Stewart but could
continue saying whatever he wanted on his national TV show; those
statements, even if Stephen knows that Jon will hear them, don't constitute
coordination. Hilarious! These Super PAC rules are so ridiculous, right?
Just remember that the reason for all these seemingly nonsensical
regulations is that the law restricts donations to candidates and parties but
not to independent groups. Citizens United said that the government can't
limit associative spending on independent political speech and
SpeechNow.org then logically struck down limits on individual PAC
donations, but one key legal rule that came even before McCain-Feingold
still stands: the government can severely limit the amount an individual can
donate to a candidate, as opposed to an independent political advocacy
group or PAC.
I'll get to the history of that rule and why I think it's untenable in a
moment, but first I should note that even if there's significantly more
independent spending in this year's campaign, blaming Super PACs (and
thus Citizens United or SpeechNow.org) for this phenomenon is a bit of a
stretch. At least given what we've seen in the Republican primaries, it's not
corporate spending or even masses of people pooling their money that has
been the story, but good ol' billionaires. Think about it: there's been all this
hubbub about Rick Santorum and Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul each having
Super PACs to attack Mitt Romney, but almost all the money from these
respective Super PACs came from one wealthy individual: Foster Friess for
Santorum, Sheldon Adelson for Gingrich, and Peter Thiel for Paul. These
guys didn't need Super PACs to do this stuff, though they formed them so
they could have other people run them and solicit donations. They could've
been doing this anyway, even without SpeechNow.org (let alone Citizens
United). Again, it's unclear how this supposed legal revolution is really
affecting things, even to the extent that there is more money involved in this
election cycle.
15. Id.
No. 2] Stephen Colbert Is Right to Lampoon Our 323
Campaign Finance System (And So Can You!)
Moving past President Obama's four errors and related misstatements
and misapprehensions about Citizens United, there's a more serious critique
of the case that needs to be addressed. Striking down the law, the argument
goes, is judicial activism, a sort of hubris that disrespects stare decisis and
all that's good and pure and true.
Look, I've written an article that I'll commend to you, "Stare Decisis
after Citizens United: When Should Courts Overturn Precedent,"
coauthored by my former legal associate Nick Mosvick, who happens to be
a University of Minnesota alumnus.'" Our point there is that, much less than
disrespecting stare decisis, Citizens United vindicates it. That is, stare
decisis isn't a forever-binding principle that prohibits courts from ever
overturning precedent, but rather a way to ensure that courts factor in
reliance interests. As the Supreme Court put it, stare decisis "is neither an
inexorable command nor a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision."" Think about it: if stare decisis meant what those who criticize
Citizens United want it to mean, then Plessy v. Ferguson could never have
yielded to Brown v. Board of Education and Bowers v. Hardwick could
have never have yielded to Lawrence v. Texas. Those earlier decisions-
upholding state laws regarding racial segregation and homosexual activity,
respectively-would still be good law.
Stare decisis is instead a prudential-not constitutional or ideological-
doctrine that has evolved as part of jurisprudential practice, one that
encourages deference to past decisions to promote predictable and
consistent development of the law, cultivate reliance on judicial decisions,
and contribute to the integrity of the judicial process. Stare decisis says that
reliance interests sometimes dictate that an incorrect legal ruling be
maintained, that the social cost of fixing a bad decision may be greater than
the benefit from fixing that decision. The Court will, after all, get the law
wrong on occasion, but it expresses no commitment to justice or its own
integrity if it rigidly refuses to retreat in the face of persuasive logic. That
would be a sign of closed-mindedness, not wise jurisprudence of legal
fidelity. So the question is, how do we apply stare decisis? When to
overturn old precedent and when to let it be?
The Supreme Court has identified a set of factors relevant to stare
decisis analysis: (1) the area of law that's at issue; (2) workability; (3)
antiquity; and, as I've stressed, (4) reliance interests. Let's apply those, in
turn, to Citizens United.
First, the Court had little incentive to sustain the kind of "leveling the
playing field" justifications for political-speech restrictions that were put in
play by Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and reinforced by
16. Shapiro & Mosvick, supra note 6, at 125-26.
17. Payne v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
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McConnell v. FEC because this was a constitutional (First Amendment)
issue. While stare decisis is strong with respect to common law cases or
state statutes-judicial rulings in these areas can be reversed by an act of
the legislature-courts cannot give as much deference to constitutional
decisions because those are much harder to change non-judicially; you need
a constitutional amendment. So when Citizens United came before the
Court and questioned the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, the
strength of stare decisis was already at its lowest ebb.
Second, with respect to workability, the system wasn't doing well. It
was (hypothetically) banning books. It was hard for the FEC to implement
and a lot turned on subjective interpretations of various magic words like
"electioneering communications." It wasn't clear to major actors what the
real rules of the game were, and all of these cases from McConnell to
Wisconsin Right to Lifel9 to FEC v. Davis20 to Citizens United showed that
there was a natural progression undoing the unworkable aspects of the
regime that McCain-Feingold had put in.
Third, antiquity. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce-which,
again, was decided in 1990, not 1900-the Court recognized a unique state
interest in guarding against corporations' unduly influencing elections by
making election-related expenditures from their general accounts (rather
than PACs or other segregated funds). It upheld a law under an equality
rationale to eliminate so-called distortions caused by corporate spending.
That's the first and only time that the Court endorsed something other than
a "corruption or appearance of corruption rationale," and it wasn't even
clear if that's what they were doing because Austin was facially inconsistent
with existing case law. That is, the Court had resolved in both Buckley v.
Valeo and in First National Bank v. Bellotti that not only no compelling
state interest existed in limiting independent corporate expenditures, but
also that the government could not limit any persons-defined to include
corporations (see another article of mine, "So What if Corporations Aren't
People?"21)-from making independent expenditures.22
While Austin would eventually be reinforced by McConnell, the years
between McConnell and Citizens United saw a series of cases that eroded
Austin's holding with respect to corporate political speech. In Wisconsin
Right to Life, the Court held that the state interest in addressing the coercive
and distortive effect of immense aggregations of wealth could not be
18. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
19. FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life (WRTL 11), 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
20. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
21. Shapiro & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 701.
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
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extended to "genuine" issue ads.23 The following year, in Davis, the Court
struck down the so-called Millionaire's Amendment to McCain-Feingold,
which relaxed campaign finance restrictions for opponents of self-funded
candidates, because it burdened those "millionaire" candidates' First
Amendment right to spend money on political speech.24 Davis didn't
grapple with Austin directly, but it did revitalize Buckley's holding that a
restriction on expenditures wasn't justified by the government's concern in
preventing corruption. It also rejected the government's argument that the
expenditure cap should be upheld on the ground that it equalizes the relative
resources of the candidates.25 Davis thus reinvigorated Buckley's point that
the government's ability to restrict the speech of some to enhance the
relative voice of others-"leveling the playing field" is incompatible with
the First Amendment. And so, the legal rule overturned by Citizens United
didn't possess the force of antiquity. Indeed, even the precedent that had
been in place for twenty years had slowly been eroded in subsequent cases.
It was Austin itself that turned out to be a departure from precedent.
That conclusion segues nicely into the final factor: reliance interests.
Chief Justice Roberts said it best in his Citizens United concurrence, which
focused on stare decisis: "[W]hen fidelity to any particular precedent does
more to damage this constitutional ideal [the rule of law] than to advance it,
we must be more willing to depart from that precedent."26 "Abrogating the
errant precedent, rather than reaffirming or extending it, might better
preserve the law's coherence and curtail the precedent's disruptive
effects."27 Of course, in Citizens United, it wasn't even clear there was any
precedent or stare decisis value to rely upon. During re-argument, then-
Solicitor General Elena Kagan abandoned the equalizing-speech claim-the
distortion by corporate voices issue-that had been Austin's rationale, in
favor of an argument regarding shareholder interests and a different kind of
quid pro quo corruption. How is a court supposed to apply stare decisis or
credit reliance on an interest that the government defending it has
abandoned? The government's new argument may or may not be
meritorious, but there's quite literally no reliance value here. As the Cato
Institute pointed out in our second Citizens United brief, "no one is relying
on having less freedom of speech."28
So what does all this mean for the brave new world after Citizens
23. WRTL 11, 551 U.S. at 471.
24. Davis, 554 U.S. at 738.
25. Id. at 741-742.
26. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
27. Id. at 921.
28. Supplemental Brief for Amicus Curiae Cato Inst. in Support of Appellant at 17, Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365223, at *17.
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United and SpeechNow.org? Well, the big question presented here is
whether the Court gave us a workable rule that enables participants in the
political market to enter and partake in the electoral process in an easy and
fair manner.
We have the Super PAC, which is based on the incentives coming from
the state of the law as I have described it and as Colbert and Stewart
satirized. How much of a problem is that? Why do we care that people are
able to spend independently? After all, without any further legislation, we
can already look up the corporate disclosures of a Super PAC and the
groups that fund it to find out the president, treasurer, and other officers. So
it's not clear what the problem is. If the problem is insufficient disclosure
rules, let's have a debate about how to set them properly, rather than trying
to restrict political speech. I don't know what else the problem could be,
because it seems hard to argue that independent political speech shouldn't
be protected.
No, the real culprit in our ridiculous situation is the pretense that
policing coordination between candidates and those who run their Super
PACs-even if they're long-time buddies or business partners29 will
eliminate the appearance of corruption that would otherwise plague the
electoral system. So what has caused this pretense that leads to the farce
that undermines the respect for the law? Well, it's not the First Amendment
or the Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment to loosen speech
restrictions in Citizens United or any other case. The real culprit is the
contribution/expenditure distinction imposed by Buckley-those caps on
donations to candidates.
When Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in
the 1970s, it attempted to fashion a kind of a packaged framework of
regulations that would remove the need for big money in at least one area of
federal elections.30 To accomplish that, Congress tried to control both the
supply and demand sides of campaign funding. First, it prohibited
individuals from contributing more than $1,000 to any candidate per
campaign. Second, it forbade individuals from spending more than $1,000
per year "relative to clearly identified candidates" while also curtailing a
candidate's use of his personal resources and limiting his overall campaign
expenditures. Third, it offered candidates public funding equal to the
expenditure cap at least in regards to the presidential race. The legislation's
success thus depended on how each component interacted with the other;
the pre-packaged deal would balance the different interests, resulting in
29. The Super PAC supporting Mitt Romney is run by his former lawyer, for example. See
The Colbert Report - Coordination Problem, supra note 12.
30. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L., No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 424, now
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (2006).
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what Congress judged to be the fairest, most-open system.
By limiting candidates' spending, FECA made the accrual of campaign
funds more burdensome but offered, at least with respect to presidential
elections, an alternative source of funding. It also arranged the funding in a
way designed to purge elections of the supposedly corrupting influence of
big money and put impecunious candidates on equal footing. That was the
goal of this finely balanced scheme.
In Buckley, the Court casually knocked a couple of FECA's pillars,
leaving the remaining structure of campaign finance regulation to collapse
on itself. It ruled that expenditure caps have to further a compelling interest
and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest-which is
insurmountable because it also said that preventing corruption and the
appearance thereof didn't justify the caps, and that's the only governmental
interest the Court has ever recognized as compelling enough to overcome
free speech rights.' At the same time, the Court severely handicapped the
effectiveness of, and incentives for candidates to participate in, public
funding programs.32 And even as candidates and independent groups can
spend unlimited amounts, Buckley permitted contribution limits to stand."
The result of Buckley's piecemeal approach, knocking out some but not all
of FECA's global reform, was to compound the system's bugs.
By refusing to strike down FECA altogether, just excising the
expenditure limits, the Court produced a system where candidates face an
unlimited demand for campaign funds but a tapered supply. They have to
spend all their time fundraising, which is another complaint people have
about our current system, right? Candidates spend all their time fundraising
instead of legislating. Some would say that's a feature not a bug-because,
of course, the government that governs least, governs best-but
nevertheless these unbalanced rules have inflated both the value of
individual campaign contributions and the priority of fundraising efforts.
Moreover, the regulations have gradually pushed the flow of money away
from candidates and parties toward advocacy groups unaccountable to the
31. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976).
32. Id. at 90-102. The Court's rulings in Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (government
can't penalize a privately funded candidate by relaxing opponent's contribution limits or
restrictions on party coordination), and Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (nor can the government issue a candidate's opponent matching funds once
spending by candidate or by independent advocates supporting him surpasses a certain threshold),
further undermined public funding schemes. The Court is simply unwilling to accept the
conditioning of an individual's free speech rights on the scope of another individual's exercise of
his. See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, Don't Feed the Alligators: Government Funding of Political Speech
and the Unyielding Vigilance of the First Amendment, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 81 (2011)
(First Amendment compelled rejection of the "trigger" provision of the Arizona Clean Elections
law, which gave participating candidates matching funds whenever a nonparticipating candidate
or independent groups supporting them spent more than the public funding allotment).
33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 229.
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public. Ironically, this dynamic undermines the main goals of campaign
finance reformers: politicians' accountability to voters and open
government.
The Buckley Court recognized that its actions would irreparably
undercut reform efforts-the justices weren't naYve-but sustained the
legislation nonetheless. Chief Justice Burger admitted that the Court's
decision did "violence to the intent of Congress" and questioned whether
the remaining "residue" left a workable program.34 Interestingly, this point
made its way into the Obamacare oral arguments during the "severability"
discussion on the third day of hearings.
It was fascinating that during that part of the arguments there was no
discussion of the Alaska Airlines, or the PCAOB case from two terms ago,
or any of the other leading severability precedents that had been cited
throughout the briefs." Instead there was this discussion of Buckley that
came about after Justice Kagan, for example, asked "is half a loaf better
than no loaf?"; wouldn't Congress have wanted at least some of the
legislation to remain even if the Court were to find part of it
unconstitutional?" Paul Clement, the most brilliant lawyer in America,
responded that "sometimes half a loaf is worse" and cited Buckley because
for nearly four decades Congress has been trying to fix the system given
that the Court struck down FECA's ban on expenditures but left the ban on
contributions in place.37 Instead, we have this dog's breakfast of campaign
finance legislation and a lurching series of Supreme Court decisions that is
approaching but not quite yet a reversal of Buckley and McConnell. And
McConnell itself is impossible to understand because you have these
multiple concurrences and dissents-eight separate opinions by six
different justices. It's just bizarre, and certainly no way to run a
constitutional republic.
We see, therefore, that campaign regulation, trying to manage the flow
of political speech, is a graveyard of well-intentioned plans. These reformist
ideals always go awry in practice because political money is a moving
target that, like water, has to go somewhere. If it's not to candidates, it'll be
to parties, and if not there, then to independent groups. If it's not to PACs, it
will be Super PACs or unincorporated individuals acting together. Because
34. Id. at 235-236 (Burger, C.J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Com. of Okla., 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
36. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393).
37. Id. at 22.
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what the government does matters to people and people want to speak about
the issues that concern them. Indeed, to the extent that "money in politics"
is a problem, the solution isn't to try to reduce the money-which we've
seen is impossible-but to reduce the scope of political activity the money
tries to influence. Shrink the size of government and its intrusions in
people's lives and you'll shrink the amount people will spend trying to get
their piece of the pie or, more likely, trying to avert ruinous public policies.
And even if you're concerned about the millions of dollars seemingly
wasted on electioneering-though Americans spend more annually on
chewing gum and Easter candy," and nobody would make or broadcast
those negative ads everyone complains about if they weren't effective-the
problem is not with your big corporate players. This is another
misapprehension of those who criticize Citizens United. Exxon and
Halliburton and all these evil companies (or even so-called good
companies, like Apple)" aren't all of a sudden dominating the political
conversation. Those types of organizations spend very little money on
political advertising, partly because they find it much more effective to
spend money on lobbying but more importantly, why would they want to
alienate half of their customer base? As Michael Jordan famously said when
he was criticized for not being involved in civil rights issues or speaking out
on politics, "Republicans buy sneakers too."40 The Fortune 500 companies
are very cautious. All they want is a legal regime they can manage with
their phalanx of lawyers and accountants, gladly accepting regulations and
restrictions that are disproportionately onerous to their scrappier,
entrepreneurial competitors. Many corporations liked the pre-Citizens
United restrictions because that meant they didn't have to decide whether to
spend money on political ads in the first place!
38. George Will, How States Are Restricting Political Speech, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2012
(presidential campaign spending roughly the same as what Americans spend on Easter candy),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-are-cracking-down-on-political-speech-with-
burdensome-laws/2012/01/31/gIQAPe6ziQ story.html; George Will, A Campaign-Finance Bill
That Doesn't Pass Muster, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2011 (Obama may raise $1 billion in private
contributions for the 2012 campaign, about half of what Americans spend on Easter candy
annually), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-campaign-finance-bill-that-doesnt-pass-
muster/2011/04/26/AFXpSqOE story.html; George Will, The Democratic Vision of Big Brother,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2010 (total election spending for every U.S. office during two-year
cycle is less than Americans spend on candy in two Halloween seasons),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/15/AR2010101504201.html.
39. Is Apple still "good"? I'm keeping my iPhone regardless.
40. Michael Jordan made the statement in response to questions about why he wouldn't
endorse the black Democratic candidate, Harvey Gantt, in the 1990 North Carolina Senate race
against Republican Jesse Helms. Kurt Badenhausen, The Business OfMichael Jordan Is Booming,
FORBES, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2011/09/22/the-business-
of-michael-jordan-is-booming/; William C. Rhoden, Jordan Finds A New Arena To Play, NEW
YORK TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/12/sports/sports-of-the-times-
jordan-finds-a-new-arena-to-play-in.html.
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On the other hand, groups composed of many individuals and smaller
players of various kinds now get to speak: your Citizens Uniteds, your
National Federations of Independent Business, your trade and advocacy
associations. They can't compete with the big boys on K Street-they can't
afford the same lawyers and lobbyists-but they sure as hell are going to
make the public aware of Congress's shenanigans. So even if we accept
"leveling the playing field" as a proper basis for campaign finance
regulation, Citizens United's freeing up of associative speech does level that
playing field in many ways.
In sum, as I said, we're left with a system that's unbalanced, unstable,
and unworkable-and we haven't seen the last of campaign finance cases
before the Court or attempts at legislative reforms.4' I would wager that
before the next census in 2020 and subsequent redistricting, in the next
decade, we'll see a fundamental systemic transformation, either because of
a legal challenge or coming from incumbents who feel threatened that they
are losing control of their message. Stephen Colbert would then have to
focus on other things, but I'm confident that he'll find something else to
ridicule and we'll be the better for it on all counts.
Thank you.
41. 1 don't even mean here the Montana case recently decided by the Court, where the
Montana Supreme Court effectively said that Citizens United doesn't apply to that state's
restrictions on independent corporate political speech and the Supreme Court reversed. Western
Tradition P'ship v. Att'y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Am. Tradition P'ship,
Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
